15 June 2025
On May 18, 2025, the Portuguese people were called to the polls for the third time since 2022 to “choose the representatives of the ruling class who will represent and oppress them in parliament.”
Faced with demands for clarification regarding his family business’s dealings with companies dependent on state concessions, Prime Minister (PM) Luís Montenegro submitted a motion of confidence to the Assembly of the Republic (AR), knowing it would be rejected by the majority opposition, thereby leading to the government’s resignation.
Aware of a favourable economic context—expected to worsen—Montenegro saw an opportunity to strengthen the electoral weight of the Democratic Alliance (AD), the centre-right governing coalition of PSD-CDS, and weaken the centre-left Socialist Party (SP), which since 1974 has been the other main historical party of capitalism. In 2024, the SP won almost as many votes and MPs as AD.
In fact, during its one-year in power since March 2024, the AD government used part of the budget surplus inherited from the PS government to reduce some taxes and to concede to various demands from public sector workers—such as police officers and teachers—who had mobilised for career improvements.
Turning the election into a plebiscite on the PM’s ethics and blaming the PS for political instability, AD’s tactic was partially successful, gaining 140,000 more votes and 11 more MPs than in the previous year’s snap election—securing 31.8% of the vote and 91 MPs out of 230. However, the gain was insufficient for an absolute majority, even with the 5.4% and 9 MPs from Iniciativa Liberal (IL, a recent ultra-liberal right-wing party).
Even together, AD and IL increased their votes by less than that of the big winner, the far-right party Chega, which increased its vote count by nearly 270,000 to over 1.4 million votes (22.76%) and gained 10 more MPs, now holding 60 seats.
For the left, the elections ended in tragedy. The PS had one of its worst results ever, losing 370,000 votes and 20 MPs, dropping to 22.83% of the vote and 58 MPs—thus becoming, for the first time, the third-largest political force in the AR.
To the left of the PS, losses were also severe. The Left Bloc (BE) was another major loser, dropping over 150,000 votes to just 125,000 votes (2%) and being reduced to a single MP. The CDU (coalition of PCP-PEV—Portuguese Communist Party and Ecologist Party “The Greens”) continued its steady decline in influence, losing 20,000 votes and 1 MP, but still maintaining a parliamentary group of 3 MPs and 2.9% of the vote.
Only Livre, the pro-European green left, increased its vote count by 50,000, strengthening its parliamentary group with 2 more MPs, reaching 4% of the vote and 6 MPs. Overall, the parliamentary left secured only one-third of the votes and 70 MPs.
Parliamentary arithmetic has not changed radically with these results, as AD still depends on either PS or Chega to pass laws in the Assembly of the Republic. However, from a political standpoint, the situation has changed profoundly. On one hand, Chega has become the party with the second-largest number of MPs, consolidating its position as the main opposition force and appearing as a potential alternative to power.
On the other hand, the right now holds an unprecedented two-thirds majority in the AR, giving it the power to change the Constitution without PS approval. As part of a global trend, the legitimacy of traditional parties and institutions has eroded further, along with the rise of the far right.
How is such an electoral defeat for the parliamentary left possible—on top of the previous year’s loss—in a country that, over the past decade, was seen as a model for reformist left-wing politics? And how is it possible that, in a country where the far right only elected its first MP in 2019, this political force has already become the second most important in parliament?
The Road to This Point: The Troika and Its Programme of Social Regress
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the conditions for financing the Portuguese economy deteriorated throughout 2010 and 2011. The Socialist Party government at the time, which resigned after its own austerity programme was rejected in parliament, decided to “submit a request for financial assistance to the European Commission in order to ensure the financing conditions for our country, our financial system, and our economy.”
The words of the then-resigning Prime Minister, José Sócrates, marked the beginning of one of the most traumatic periods for the Portuguese people since the end of the dictatorship. Under fierce attack from financial speculators, the country was thrown—under the guise of European “solidarity”—into a draconian austerity programme designed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), collectively known as the troika.
Between 2011 and 2014, Portugal became, alongside other European countries, a testing ground for neoliberal policies aimed at achieving specific macroeconomic results regardless of their social consequences.
The troika programme, initially negotiated by the PS, was enthusiastically implemented by the PSD-CDS government that came to power following the 2011 snap legislative elections. The new Prime Minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, even declared his intention to “go beyond the troika”—that is, to implement even harsher austerity measures in order to meet budgetary goals faster than stipulated in the programme.
This eagerness to be the “model student” of unelected foreign bureaucrats serving the interests of big financial capital translated into a “brutal increase in taxes,” cuts to pensions and public sector salaries, attacks on labour and tenants’ rights, increased costs for accessing public healthcare and education, and the privatisation of public stakes in strategic companies, among other measures serving the interests of big capital.
These measures had tragic consequences for the lives of millions of Portuguese people. Between 2011 and 2015, more than half a million Portuguese emigrated in search of better living conditions, fleeing from unemployment, which exceeded 17%, and from precarious employment conditions.
During these years, the seeds of the current housing crisis were also sown. The introduction of the “golden visa” programme, changes to rent laws that allowed for increases in long-frozen rents, generous tax incentives for real estate investment funds, and the external promotion of the “Portugal brand” led to enormous pressure on the housing market, eventually causing a meteoric rise in house prices and rental costs.
By the end of the adjustment programme—achieved at the expense of the lives of millions of workers—the right-wing government met its goals: deficit reduction, return to financial markets, a modest economic recovery and, above all, improved conditions for capital accumulation in Portugal.
But the troika years were also marked by massive mobilisation against the government, the troika, and their policies, with more than one million people—one tenth of the entire population—taking part in large-scale protests and strikes. In the 2015 legislative elections, the PSD-CDS coalition came in first with 36.86%, but lost its absolute majority.
Co-responsible for four difficult years for most Portuguese, the PS struggled to present itself as a credible alternative and came in second, with 32.3% of the vote and 86 MPs. The working-class discontent was partially reflected in 2015 in the results of the parties to the left of the PS: the Left Bloc (BE) rose from 8 to 19 MPs, while the CDU secured 17 MPs. Together, the two forces won nearly one million votes, or 18.5%, and 36 seats.
The new composition of the Assembly of the Republic allowed the PS, led by António Costa—after giving reassurances to Portuguese bankers and European leaders, notably Angela Merkel, that he would not threaten the interests of large economic groups—to form a minority government with parliamentary support from BE, PCP, and PEV.
The PS signed separate written agreements with these parties, but with a common objective of “turning the page on the impoverishment policies pursued by PSD and CDS.” This parliamentary arrangement became known as the “geringonça” (contraption or makeshift alliance).
The “Geringonça”: A Brief Moment of Social Conciliation
After the Troika period and right-wing government, marked by explicit attacks on the working class and growing anger and mobilisation against both the government and capitalism, the bourgeoisie came to welcome the prospect of greater profit stability through a government of class conciliation—one that would preserve the structural counter-reforms of the Troika era while softening class struggle.
Between 2015 and 2019, the “geringonça” government, dependent in parliament on the parties to the left of the PS, reversed pension and salary cuts as well as the tax hikes demanded by the Troika and loyally executed by the right-wing government. During this period, the monthly minimum wage rose from €485 to €600, and other significant social gains were achieved: a freeze on university tuition fees, the reversal and reduction of co-payments in the National Health Service (SNS), free school textbooks and partial subsidies for crèches, reduced prices for public transport passes, the reinstatement of a 35-hour public sector work-week, and a social electricity tariff.
However, the “geringonça” government remained faithful to its commitment to the bourgeoisie. It did not reverse changes to labour or rental laws enacted by the PSD and CDS, which remain in place to this day, nor did it unfreeze career progression in the public sector. When the stability of capitalism required public capital injections into failing private banks, the PS joined forces with the PSD, leaving its “geringonça” partners behind.
Capitalising on the Troika’s traumatic legacy among the Portuguese people, the PS made fiscal consolidation the Holy Grail of its policy, leading to the progressive underfunding of public services—an austerity policy in disguise. Public investment was even lower during the “geringonça” than during the Troika period, reaching a historic low of 1.6% of GDP in 2016. It was also during this period that housing prices began their massive rise—about 10% per year—a trend that continues today, a decade later.
This was also a time when major labour struggles and strikes, such as those by nurses, dock workers, hazardous materials drivers, and Volkswagen Auto-Europa workers, were actively opposed by leaders of the BE, PCP, and the CGTP (the main trade union confederation, controlled by the PCP). Reformist left forces showed that their main role in the “geringonça” was to use their authority to contain class struggle—even repressing strikes. Several independent unions emerged during these years in opposition to the CGTP, which has since lost much of its mobilisation capacity.
After four years of political and economic stability and a recovery in incomes and rights, the PS increased its vote share to 36.3% in the 2019 legislative elections, though still short of an absolute majority. The CDU and BE saw their support shrink to a combined total of under 16%, including a loss of 5 MPs by the PCP-PEV coalition. These elections also marked the emergence of the Chega party, with André Ventura becoming the first far-right MP elected since the 1974–75 revolution.
In the new political context, the PS sought to retain the support of its now-weakened former partners, demanding continued parliamentary backing without offering much in return. During the pandemic, the BE and PCP maintained their conciliatory posture, even as labour rights were attacked—for example, through the lay-off scheme, which funded company profits with public money while workers’ wages were cut. The PCP and PEV even enabled the 2021 state budget to pass by abstaining. The BE, realising that its conciliatory stance was eroding its support base, voted against it.
Finally, the rupture between the PS and the parties to its left came in 2021, when the state budget for the following year was rejected with the votes of all other parties. Faced with this scenario, the President of the Republic (PR) dissolved the Assembly and called new legislative elections.
The Electoral Decline of the Left and the Monster of the Far Right
During the campaign for the snap elections held in 2022, the PS focused its attacks on the BE and CDU for rejecting the state budget and fully claimed the successes of the “geringonça”, while waving the threat of a return of the right, now in alliance with the far right.
Acknowledging the PSD’s inability to present itself as a viable governing alternative—due to its program being nearly identical to that of the PS—and the strong aversion that André Ventura’s party provokes among centrist voters, António Costa and the PS gave Chega disproportionate political prominence relative to its actual electoral weight. In doing so, they aimed to present themselves as the only democratic alternative to the rise of the far right.
This “bear hug” from the PS toward the parties to its left resulted in an absolute majority in parliament, with 120 MPs and 41.4% of the vote, while the majority of left-wing MPs were lost: the BE was reduced to 4.4% and 5 MPs, and the CDU to 4.3% and 6 MPs (all from the PCP, none from the PEV).
On the right, Chega gained 7.2% and elected 12 MPs, starting to attract protest votes that had previously gone to the radical left. The ultra-liberal right party IL also scored a significant win, with 4.9% and 8 MPs. Traditional right-wing forces suffered yet another defeat: the PSD garnered only 27.7%, and the CDS was wiped out of parliament.
Despite the absolute majority, the term that began in 2022 proved to be the most difficult for António Costa. As elsewhere in the world, 2022 and 2023 were marked by rising prices for essential goods. Even though energy price increases were less severe in Portugal than in other countries, Costa responded very conservatively to inflation, arguing for nearly a year that wages should not rise in line with inflation due to the risk of an inflationary spiral. The prolonged underfunding of public services, alongside the growth of the private sectors in healthcare and education, became evident during these years, with public schools and hospitals unable to function properly.
The year 2023 was marked by intense struggles, particularly among public sector workers—teachers, school staff, doctors, nurses, and judicial employees. It was the year with the most strikes since 2013, the peak of resistance to the Troika and the right-wing program. It also saw the emergence of a mass housing movement in response to the ongoing rise in housing costs, regularly drawing 30,000 people to demonstrations.
Submissive to the growing sectors of the bourgeoisie in Portugal—tourism, education, health, real estate, insurance, agriculture, fishing, and services reliant on cheap labour—and emboldened by its absolute majority, the PS government responded arrogantly to workers, refusing to meet their legitimate demands.
Institutionally, 2022 and 2023 were also years marked by a series of resignations of PS government figures due to being highly controversial or involved in ethically questionable conduct. The ruling class ceased to see the PS as a reliable guarantor of stability for their business interests and once again looked to the right for alternatives.
At the end of 2023, the government was unexpectedly shaken by a murky legal case involving the prime minister. Although there was no concrete suspicion against António Costa, he resigned, and the President of the Republic called new legislative elections.
Despite relatively good results from the perspective of the capitalist economy, after a year and a half of scandals, an inflation crisis, and possibly the effects of the legal case, the PS lost the March 2024 elections to the AD (PSD-CDS), albeit by just over 50,000 votes. The result brought no greater stability to the ruling class, and the poor performance of both traditional bourgeois parties (PSD and PS) revealed a political regime suffering from declining legitimacy, in line with the global crisis of capitalism.
For its part, Chega received over one million votes—many from former abstentionists, as turnout rose from 52% to 60% (nearly 1 million new voters)—and elected 50 MPs. By contrast, the left suffered more setbacks: beyond the PS’s fall, the CDU lost another 2 MPs, although the BE recovered nearly 40,000 votes but failed to increase its parliamentary representation.
Over the past year, the AD government led by Luís Montenegro—reliant in parliament on either the PS or Chega—has implemented a right-wing agenda, continuing the PS’s policies but with a more aggressive stance toward the working class. Its first move was to repeal the PS’s modest and insufficient measures to contain rent prices. It formalised the outsourcing of healthcare to the private sector, even handing over management of some public health centres, and adopted a consistent policy of reducing taxes on corporate profits and high incomes.
It adopted the far-right narrative of rising immigration and insecurity, despite Portugal being one of the safest countries in the world, and made it harder for immigrants to regularise their status.
To implement this right-wing program, the government consistently shared responsibility with the PS, which approved the 2025 state budget under the pretext of avoiding Chega’s influence over the AD. With the left marginalised and a centrist consensus emerging, Chega has increasingly positioned itself as the main opposition force.
Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, the AD took advantage of the healthy state of public finances to do what the PS had refused: conceding to some of the demands of public sector workers who had fought hard in previous years (teachers, police officers, doctors) and cutting some taxes for middle-income groups, gaining the support of less-exploited segments of the population and softening social discontent.
From this point, the story returns to where this text began. Seen as responsible for political instability, the PS is swallowed by the monster of the far right it helped create. The PCP and BE continue to falter, unable to win back the protest vote that has found refuge in Chega and its simplistic, divisive messaging aimed at workers.
Why Does the Parliamentary Left Fail Electorally While the Far Right Grows?
At a moment of unprecedented weakness for the left in Portugal’s democratic history, it is urgent to reflect on why the working class is so reluctant to embrace the message of the parliamentary left. Why do so many workers—most of them earning low wages, trapped in precarious jobs, struggling to access housing, or forced to emigrate—vote against their own interests, for parties that promise tax cuts they won’t benefit from, or that target immigrants who work alongside them?
These questions are all the more relevant considering that the economic policies adopted by parties committed to capitalism perpetuate or even worsen social inequalities and poverty for millions of workers. They promise future stability but subject countries to cyclical economic and financial crises, prospects of war, and environmental catastrophe—all costs borne by workers and the most disadvantaged.
Part of the electoral failure of the BE and CDU lies in the unfavourable national and international context for an anti-militarist left. The dominant class’s push to increase defence spending—on armaments and preparations for future wars—has been intense and effective in shaping workers’ consciousness. This spending is not yet widely recognised as an attack on their rights. It partly explains the rise of Livre, a pro-EU, pro-NATO, and pro-militarisation left party, and the decline of the BE and CDU, the only parties opposing contributions to future wars.
Anti-militarist sentiment will likely grow as rising defence budgets more concretely translate into cuts to workers’ living conditions. It could grow further if Portugal becomes more directly involved in the inter-imperialist wars now in preparation. Still, we must be prepared for a challenging context in the years to come.
Another key reason is the legacy of PS governments and the “geringonça” period. Though BE and CDU have campaigned on leftist platforms, addressing real working-class issues like taxing the rich, rent controls, public investment, shift workers’ rights, and wage increases, these parties and their programs are not seen as real solutions by most workers.
Even though the 2015–2019 “geringonça” government is the highest-rated by the Portuguese people (receiving an average score of 5 out of 10), many workers—especially the younger ones—see the last eight years of left governance (that is, PS governments, six of them backed by BE and CDU) as responsible for the deepening housing crisis and the collapse of public services.
These governments also failed to change the low-wage character of the Portuguese economy, which continues to force many into emigration. Workers, quite reasonably, do not believe that the same parties who failed to control housing prices and strengthen public services in recent years can do so now. For some sections of the working class, the left parties are the ones who repressed their strikes—even during the “geringonça” years—abandoning and betraying them. This memory has hurt the PS, BE, and CDU alike.
Moreover, the left parties—especially BE and PCP—have done little to correct this memory, still speaking positively of the “geringonça” without acknowledging its failures, and sometimes even seeking to revive it. In doing so, they fail to present themselves as a true alternative and instead appear as potential crutches for the PS.
In this context—marked by the social-democratic failure of eight years of PS government—it becomes easier for middle classes, and for significant sections of youth and workers, to believe that the solution to their problems lies in tax cuts and “reforms” (i.e., disguised privatisations) of public services rather than in social-democratic promises that have already failed.
Still, much of the working class does not vote for the right out of belief in liberal solutions. For those most outraged by the current situation—whether from the petty bourgeoisie crushed by taxes and big capital, or from the working class abandoned by capitalism—the party that presents itself as “anti-system” is more appealing than left-wing parties that defend the Constitution, respect for bourgeois institutions, the “achievements of April”, and the supposed stability of the “geringonça”—all of which, for many workers and young people, are synonymous with a rotten system that does not protect their interests.
Chega has used every platform it’s been given to promote lies, hatred, and violence, even advocating “shoot to kill” policies against non-white populations. As a result, it has drawn in thieves, abusers, pedophiles, and other criminals, and has more leaders and activists facing legal proceedings than any other party. In speeches following its recent electoral victories, Chega leader André Ventura has consistently declared his goal of eliminating the left in Portugal—clearing the path to trample workers and the most oppressed.
Chega has exploited rising immigration—driven by market forces and imperialist exploitation—to attack immigrants’ rights, a discourse reinforced by the AD itself. In doing so, it divides the working class, channeling anger at the system toward its most oppressed members, and prepares the ground for intensified exploitation of immigrant workers—clearly serving the most reactionary sectors of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, who depend on cheap labour.
Part of Chega’s social base and electorate is overtly reactionary—landlords, property owners, employers, and police—reflecting a rightward shift of the bourgeoisie, which increasingly requires a more aggressive posture and deeper worker exploitation to maintain and increase profit rates, as is evident internationally. But another segment of its voters is simply disillusioned with PS and PSD governments and the left’s poor record when in power. These voters seek change and are drawn to slogans like “against 50 years of corruption,” despite the many contradictions these slogans entail.
Perspectives for Struggle
The new AD government is expected to continue implementing a right-wing agenda with the support of the PS, which will likely play the role of the “good cop”—accepting a moderated version of AD’s program out of fear that AD might otherwise pursue its more radical proposals in alliance with Chega. The AD’s government program includes an increase of the military budget, plans to restrict strike laws, divert part of social security contributions to private pension funds, and outsource public health and education services to the private sector.
The two-thirds right-wing majority in Parliament opens the door to a possible constitutional revision. Indeed, several right-wing figures are eager to use this opportunity to attack the right to strike and to allow dismissals without just cause.
AD will likely fear losing centrist electoral support if it aligns too closely with the hard right. As a result, it may back a more moderate right-wing constitutional revision—possibly with PS support. This collusion between AD and PS is expected to continue benefiting Chega electorally.
With less fiscal room than in the past year, the next economic crisis or political scandal could see Montenegro and the AD suffer heavy losses to Chega. Simultaneously, as AD increasingly normalizes Chega’s proposals, a coalition government between AD and Chega—currently seen as unstable—could become a viable option for the bourgeoisie in the near future.
Chega’s rise is concerning, as it has emboldened racist and fascist groups to engage in public actions, including attacks on left-wing activists. However, Chega has not yet succeeded in mobilizing reactionary mass movements to use violence against the left, the trade union movement, or the most vulnerable and oppressed workers.
The left still significantly outnumbers the right in street demonstrations. In fact, in the last three years, the popular commemorations of the April 25th Revolution—the beginning of the 1974–75 revolution—have been massive, much larger than in previous years (including the “geringonça” years and the pandemic), bringing around a million people to the streets in 2024 and 2025.
Though these are a mix of celebration and protest, the April 25th marches clearly express anti-fascist sentiment and a defense of democratic and social rights. In the past year, there were also important protests against police violence, particularly against immigrants and non-white people. This shows, in practice, that despite electoral results, Ventura’s dream of eliminating the left from society is far from secured.
The coming months will remain dominated by electoral politics, with local elections in October and presidential elections in January 2026. At this moment, the electoral terrain is unfavorable to the left, as the right has the momentum. Furthermore, the focus on elections in public discourse makes the next period less conducive to social struggles.
Still, there is work to be done by those committed to changing society. The LGBTQI+ marches in Lisbon and Porto on June 7, and the anti-racist protest on June 10 – Portugal Day, when fascist and racist groups also march – saw significant turnout.
On June 28, a new protest for housing rights is expected to be an important moment of mobilization. From our point of view, there is a lack of confidence among the working class in the housing movement’s ability to secure real victories capable of changing Portugal’s dire housing situation.
We also believe that trade unions—especially those in the CGTP—have not sufficiently engaged in this struggle. The absence of unions from this and other struggles reinforces the perception that unions only care about relatively privileged sectors, offering no benefit to most of the working class. Given that access to housing is one of the main factors affecting the ability to retain professionals in public services—and since housing is already a key demand of public sector unions—we believe the labor movement should become seriously involved in this cause.
The power of the strike, still present in some sectors (such as the railway sector, where 100% of CP workers joined a strike just days before the last elections) and lacking in the housing movement, should be used until real rent and price controls are implemented. This must include expropriating unoccupied homes and real estate funds to create public housing.
The issue of presenting a political alternative on the left—one that offers a real path to transform society and that can mobilize and inspire the working class to organize—remains critical.
In 2015, the reformist yet combative left managed to gather one million voters outraged by the attacks imposed by the bourgeoisie’s bureaucratic lackeys. However, in that moment of significant electoral growth in progressive forces and social agitation, the left chose to settle for a partial reversal of the troika’s program.
While it did achieve substantial improvements for much of the working class, it failed to use its parliamentary position to mobilize workers and pressure the PS government to dismantle the neoliberal agenda in full. Instead, it settled for minor victories, easily co-opted by the PS, and was ultimately held responsible for PS-led attacks on the working class.
To avoid repeating past mistakes, the left must ground its strategy in the strength and confidence of the working class, not in the hope of parliamentary agreements. It must not hesitate to name the true culprits of workers’ and the oppressed’s suffering: the millionaires, the rent-seekers, the war profiteers, the destroyers of the environment, those who benefit from job insecurity and the exploitation of the most vulnerable, such as immigrants and low-wage, non-unionized workers.
Above all, it must name the capitalist system itself, where profit is king and overrides everything else. The left must put forward a program that directly addresses the aspirations of workers and the most oppressed, offering socialist solutions that challenge private property and the logic of profit and markets.
It must give people the confidence that their struggle can change the world—if backed by a coherent program that anticipates the bourgeoisie’s moves and prepares to counter them—culminating in the overthrow of capitalism through the working class’s seizure of power and the start of a transition to a classless, oppression-free society.
The left should also speak emotionally, because emotions are what move the masses—and our political enemies have no qualms about using negative emotions to divide the working class. But while the far right uses lies and hatred against the most vulnerable, we must respond truthfully but with equal intensity, exposing those they truly serve.
Even if the task is arduous and the political climate hostile, the left must not falter in its struggle. We, as Marxists, find meaning in revolutionary work because we are conscious of the relationships of exploitation and oppression that define bourgeois society—and because we believe a real alternative to the capitalist system is possible: a new society where the production and distribution of resources and innovations are planned democratically to meet everyone’s needs, avoiding war and environmental destruction.