12 June 2025
Just a year and a half ago, Poland was hailed as the greatest success story of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. After eight years of right-wing populist PiS (Law and Justice) rule, the 2023 parliamentary elections brought a broad liberal coalition to power. Western politicians and media responded with jubilation — congratulating Poland for “returning to European values” and proclaiming the beginning of the defeat of right-wing populism in the region.
That narrative has now collapsed with the victory of the PiS candidate, Karol Nawrocki, in the 2025 presidential elections — a man with alleged ties to far-right and criminal networks. Nawrocki’s narrow victory over the centre right liberal candidate Rafał Trzaskowski by only 370,00 votes has been hailed as a triumph by far-right leaders internationally. Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, and Marine Le Pen were quick to send their congratulations.
From the start, the far right performed disturbingly well, with significant support for extremist candidates — especially among young men. Nawrocki’s eventual win, backed by an even broader base, confirmed this wasn’t just a fringe protest.
And all this comes just weeks after the defeat of a far-right candidate in Romania’s presidential elections — a moment that, for many in the West, seemed to confirm that the political winds had begun to shift (although this was accomplished only after the first round was annulled following the surprise victory of an almost unknown far-right candidate).
Following the liberal coalition’s victory in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections and then the result in Romania, commentators prematurely declared the far right to be in retreat. But with Nawrocki’s win in Poland — on the heels of Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the meteoric rise of Reform UK — it is clearly the right-populists and the far right who now feel the wind in their sails.
Why the far right Is winning in Poland
In the first round of the election, as many as 21% of voters supported the far-right Konfederacja candidate Sławomir Mentzen and ex-Konfederacja politician Grzegorz Braun. This result confirms not only rising far-right support, but also a deepening rejection of the entire political establishment by a growing section of society.
This rebellion did not come out of nowhere. It is not only the product of right-wing propaganda in the media and schools, but also the legacy of capitalist restoration and decades of neoliberal policies, including privatization of state assets, deregulation, privatisation and cuts in public services, labour law changes and the raising of the retirement age These policies have deepened inequality and marginalised large parts of the population. Added to that are years of betrayal and compromise by the so-called left, and the discrediting — in the eyes of many — of anything even loosely associated with left-wing politics. And of course the decades-long experience of Stalinism continues to cast a long shadow over Poland, even impacting on the consciousness of generations that were born years after Stalinism collapsed.
The decades of neoliberal hegemony have created fertile ground for the far right, particularly around Mentzen, whose ultra-liberal, economic libertarian rhetoric resonates with significant segments of the youth. In the absence of a credible left-wing, anti-establishment alternative, more and more young people are being drawn toward far-right forces that cynically present themselves as “anti-establishment” — offering simplistic solutions to complex crises.
For some, already indoctrinated to believe that neoliberalism is the only viable economic framework, Mentzen’s slogans come across as “common sense.” His reactionary social views are either downplayed or actively embraced. For others, however, shaped by years of anti-communist and nationalist indoctrination, it is the authoritarian and nationalist elements of his politics — rather than the economic libertarianism — that prove most compelling.
This internal division within Mentzen’s base was made visible in the second round of voting, when around 30% of his supporters backed Trzaskowski — a clear sign that not all were driven by the same ideological motivations. Konfederacja has skillfully exploited this dynamic, redirecting legitimate anger and frustration into hatred toward scapegoats: immigrants, LGBTQ+ people, and so-called ‘corrupt elites.’ Indeed, corruption is big in Poland, but Konfederacja never defines these ‘elites’ in class terms.
The polarization among youth
The deep polarization among young people is clearly reflected in voting patterns. On the one hand, there is a sign of potential for radical, left-wing, anti-capitalist politics in the strong support for Adrian Zandberg and his Razem party (19% support among voters aged 18–29). On the other hand, Mentzen and Konfederacja enjoy even more support among younger voters (35% in the same age group, especially among young men), revealing the scale of the danger.
This vacuum is exacerbated by the co-optation and fragmentation of organized labour. While the OPZZ trade union federation backed Nowa Lewica’s Magdalena Biejat, the influential Solidarity (Solidarność) endorsed Karol Nawrocki. Nawrocki secured this by pledging to maintain social benefits, defend the minimum wage, and crucially, oppose the EU’s Green Deal – issues resonating with workers facing economic precarity.
You can’t drink a beer with fascism
That Rafał Trzaskowski and the Civic Coalition (KO) are incapable of reversing this trend, and particularly of stopping the rise of the far right is becoming increasingly evident. It is their history of neoliberal politics and longstanding contempt for poorer regions, the countryside, and the working class that first created the conditions for PiS’s success, and now for the far right’s rise.
Recent gestures of “normalization” toward Mentzen by KO’s Radosław Sikorski and Rafał Trzaskowski, with them shaking hands and sharing a beer with Mentzen in an attempt to win over some of his voters in the second round — are not just repulsive. They legitimize Konfederacja and draw it deeper into the political mainstream.
Media pundits swooned over this as a “brilliant move” and a new, modern style of politics. In reality, this is cynical image-building — attempting to win over Mentzen’s voters for the second round and preparing the ground for Mentzen and Konfederacja to become a possible ally in the future. While KO might differ on issues like abortion, LGBT+ rights, the EU, and the church (though it also has a socially conservative wing), on economic policy it could easily find common ground with Mentzen’s ultra-liberalism.
KO Is no guarantee of defending democracy
KO had no real strategy for stopping the far right in this election. Its avoidance of issues like abortion, LGBT+ rights, poverty, and inequality left left-wing voters feeling entirely excluded from public debate. Perhaps some, while holding their noses, voted for Trzaskowski in the second round just to block Nawrocki. But many simply boycotted the second round of the election altogether. This could be seen in the turnout in these elections compared to the 2023 parliamentary elections (74.4% in 2023 compared to 71.6% in the second round in 2025).
Meanwhile, the fact that Nawrocki — despite his alleged ties to gangsterism, pimping, football hooliganism, and fraud — was still able to win shows the dramatic failure of Trzaskowski and KO to convince voters that their vision of the future offers anything at all. Empty slogans about “freedom,” “democracy,” “the rule of law,” and “the European Union” were not enough.
Tusk’s government has not only failed to keep its election promises, notably on liberalisation of the abortion law, but is also continuing the brutal border policies against migrants on the Belarusian border, including supporting pushbacks. The increasing militarism, and expanding military budget confirm that KO is not a guarantor of democracy or human rights. On the contrary — in many areas, it continues the PiS agenda.
Tusk’s coalition government was careful not to cut the highly popular benefits that PiS introduced when in power, such as the 500 plus child benefit and the extra “13th month” pension payments. In fact, it even increased them in line with inflation, increased the minimum wage and raised public sector pay. However, mistrust among the working class remained, with a firm belief that the government was biding its time until after its expected presidential victory before going onto the attack. This was also fuelled by leaks and rumours of a planned increase in the pension age, and most recently Tusk’s announcement that the economy needs deregulation and his plans to bring on board a billionaire businessman to oversee it, which did nothing to win over working class votes.
Unfortunately, instead of campaigning for a real left, anti-capitalist alternative to war, poverty, and the cost of living crisis, Zandberg and his party, Razem, which is styled on Podemos, worked within the confines of capitalism, supporting increased military spending and a bigger role of imperialism in the region. Although Razem refused to officially join the government coalition after the parliamentary elections, the party did give it a vote of confidence and was a member of the broader Nowa Lewica left-wing alliance, which is part of the ruling coalition. Later, Razem tried to distance itself from the government by leaving Nowa Lewica. Razem’s policies, however, have remained right-wing reformist and pro-imperialist.
Despite his use of Piłsudski-era imagery — controversial, given its nationalist undertones — Zandberg secured 4.9% of the vote, more than the candidate of the much larger Nowa Lewica (4.2%). As mentioned, that vote was particularly impressive among young voters. In the aftermath of the presidential elections, Razem reported thousands of young people asking to join the party.
For many people — especially women — the election result is a shock and a great defeat. In conversations, words of despair and a feeling that “all hope has been buried” appear. After years of brutal attacks on women’s rights, mass demonstrations and later hope for change after the mass mobilisation during the parliamentary elections, the presidential result means one thing to many: there will be no liberalization of the right to abortion, there will be no settlement with PiS, the Church will continue to dominate society and control our lives, and there is a very real prospect that PiS will return to power, this time with the far-right.
Responsibility for this outcome lies squarely with the coalition government — especially KO and the conservative Trzecia Droga, but also Nowa Lewica. They prepared the ground for Nawrocki’s victory. But even if Trzaskowski had won, the expected reforms could still have stalled in the Sejm because of opposition of the conservative MPs from KO and Trzecia Droga.
On the other hand, perhaps Nawrocki’s victory will hasten the disillusionment with politicians from the ruling coalition and galvanise the groups fighting for the rights of women, LGBTQ+ people, or human rights in general.
There will be a growing realization that the right to legal abortion and marriage equality as well as the separation of the church and state will not be handed as a gift from liberal politicians, but must be fought for on the street, by creating a strong and independent social movement.
Unfortunately, there is a danger that Nawrocki’s victory may also embolden hooligan groups — which are often a reservoir for fascist movements — who may feel they can go unpunished, since they have “their man” in the Presidential Palace, with the power to pardon.
Nawrocki’s victory is not merely a political setback — it is a symptom of a deeper systemic crisis. Liberal democracy, bound to a failing capitalist model, is increasingly incapable of meeting people’s needs or halting the drift toward authoritarianism. We need a real socialist alternative — rooted in working-class struggle and determined to dismantle the capitalist system that breeds inequality, crisis, and authoritarianism.