It’s now over four years since the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military overthrew the elected government. The coup met widespread resistance and escalated into a brutal civil war. PRMI reporters spoke to the Marxist journalist and historian Phyo Win Latt.
24 March 2025
PRMI: With the world news dominated by the Genocide in Gaza, war in Ukraine, as well as the escalation of brutal conflicts in Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo, the situation in Myanmar has been pushed out of the global media. How would you describe what is currently going on in Myanmar?
PWL: Myanmar remains embroiled in a complex and intensifying revolutionary and civil war, overshadowed internationally by higher-profile conflicts elsewhere, yet devastating in both its human consequences and political impact.
Since late 2023, the conflict has escalated dramatically, notably following Operation 1027—a major coordinated offensive launched in northern Shan State by the opposition Three Brotherhood Alliance. This alliance consists of the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).
This campaign resulted in substantial territorial gains, including the capture of Laukkai in early 2024, prompting China to mediate a temporary ceasefire to contain instability along its shared border.
The Arakan Army recently secured substantial territorial gains in Rakhine State, significantly undermining the military junta’s control. By December 2024, its capture of strategic areas such as Gwa Township had clearly highlighted the regime’s increasingly vulnerable position.
Nevertheless, the humanitarian situation remains severe, with over half a million civilians displaced by the ongoing conflict. Concurrently, resistance groups in southern Chin State and Sagaing Region have sustained persistent pressure, successfully overrunning junta positions through continuous clashes, exemplified by recent incidents in Sagaing.
The Arakan Army recently announced capturing two Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) from regime forces. This represents a significant tactical gain, although the operational status of these captured units is unclear.
Furthermore, the Arakan Army claimed control over Myebon town, though the precise timing of this takeover is unspecified. Reports indicate limited or no resistance from junta forces during this event; according to Narinjara, approximately 300 individuals—including military personnel, police officers, government workers, and their families—were rapidly evacuated from Myebon to Kyaukphyu by boat. With Myebon now secured, the AA asserts its authority over five major towns in Rakhine: Pauktaw, Kyauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, and Myebon, marking a substantial territorial consolidation.
International responses have remained largely symbolic and ineffective. Although the UN Security Council has occasionally issued statements of concern, no substantial actions, such as an arms embargo or referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC), have been enacted.
Similarly, ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus remains stalled, failing to achieve meaningful progress toward resolving the crisis. Regional responses by China and Thailand have primarily focused on mitigating the spillover effects of transnational crime rather than addressing the junta’s atrocities directly, further illustrating Myanmar’s deepening fragmentation and the regime’s diminished territorial control.
Consequently, Myanmar’s population suffers profoundly under continued violence and humanitarian distress, largely overlooked by a world preoccupied with crises perceived as more pressing elsewhere.
PRMI: Has the military succeeded in maintaining control of the rest of the country?
PWL: Myanmar’s military continues to deploy brutal tactics, including airstrikes and heavy artillery, resulting in widespread civilian casualties and mass displacement. Nevertheless, the military’s authority has significantly weakened, particularly following the initiation of Operation 1027, launched on October 27, 2023.
Although the junta still controls key urban centers of strategic economic significance, it has lost authority over more than half the country to a resilient and increasingly unified opposition.
Its reliance on terror tactics has backfired, fueling more profound resistance among the population. Economic collapse and international isolation have further diminished its power. Consequently, the prospect of the military regaining complete control grows increasingly unlikely as its governance steadily unravels.
Returning from a recent state visit to Russia and Belarus, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has reaffirmed plans to hold elections in December 2025 or January 2026. Critics dismiss these promises as a desperate attempt to manufacture legitimacy.
With significant opposition parties banned, fragmented territorial control, and no credible path to stability, the notion of a legitimate election remains illusory.
The military’s claims of restoring order ring hollow amid ongoing battlefield defeats, rising defections, and a civilian population that overwhelmingly views the regime as the source of their suffering.
On 11 March, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing met in Nay Pyi Taw with China’s Special Envoy for Asian Affairs, Deng Xijun, according to The Global New Light of Myanmar. Deng’s visit occurred shortly after Min Aung Hlaing returned from Russia and Belarus—two of the junta’s strongest international allies.
As highlighted by the International Crisis Group in 2022, the junta seeks closer relations with Moscow as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese influence. Min Aung Hlaing and Deng discussed the planned elections, China’s involvement in Myanmar’s so-called “peace process,” narcotics eradication efforts, cross-border trade, and joint action against cyber scam centers.
The Chinese envoy last visited Myanmar in August 2024, soon after the MNDAA captured Lashio, a strategic hub in northern Shan State. Since then, the junta and MNDAA have signed a China-brokered ceasefire, though reports conflict on whether the MNDAA plans to withdraw from Lashio gradually. Similarly, the Chinese-mediated talks between the junta and the TNLA concluded without agreement last month. Meanwhile, clashes persist between the AA and junta forces in Rakhine State, including ongoing fighting in Kyaukphyu, the starting point for pipelines transporting oil and gas across Myanmar to China’s Yunnan Province.
PRMI: Attempts by the military regime to conduct a census to prepare for an election have been met by widespread resistance. Why is this?
PWL: The 2024 Myanmar Census was conducted between October 1 and 15, 2024. However, data collection extended into December in certain regions due to ongoing security threats and logistical difficulties stemming from the civil war.
The primary purpose of this census was to gather demographic and household information in preparation for voter registration ahead of the military regime’s planned general election in 2025. However, the election itself faces widespread condemnation from resistance groups and international observers, who regard it as illegitimate due to exclusionary practices and the broader context of conflict.
According to the junta’s figures, the 2024 census revealed a slight population decline compared to the 2014 census, recording approximately 32.2 million individuals, with males representing 46.9 percent (15,105,215) and females 53.1 percent (17,086,192).
Notably absent from this count was the Muslim Rohingya minority, intentionally excluded once again following the precedent set in 2014. This deliberate omission underscores the regime’s ongoing policy of marginalization and systematic disenfranchisement of the Rohingya community, exacerbating their statelessness and vulnerability.
The census was further hindered by significant security and logistical issues, which delayed data collection in many conflict-affected areas until December. These disruptions highlight the precarious control of the junta across Myanmar and reflect the challenges inherent in attempting to legitimize a deeply fractured and contested political landscape. The exclusion of the Rohingya and other marginalized groups from this exercise symbolizes the regime’s continuing disregard for human rights, further diminishing any remaining prospects for a credible electoral process.
PRMI: How are the different ethnic armies faring? Are they unified, or are there tensions between them? What are their ideologies?
PWL: Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have emerged as pivotal actors in the revolution against the military junta, significantly weakening its grip and reshaping the conflict’s dynamics.
Groups like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the AA have achieved notable battlefield successes, capturing strategic towns and hundreds of military bases. These victories have substantially diminished the junta’s territorial control.
Nevertheless, each EAO encounters distinct challenges. The AA faces issues such as managing large-scale civilian displacement and international scrutiny in Rakhine State. At the same time, the KIA navigates intricate inter-ethnic tensions, exemplified by recent disputes with the TNLA in northern Shan State.
Since the 2021 coup, unity among ethnic armed groups has reached unprecedented heights, notably demonstrated by coordinated initiatives like Operation 1027, launched in October 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
This tactical collaboration—bolstered by joint military training, shared arms supplies, and strategic alignment with the National Unity Government (NUG) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs)—has enabled opposition forces to control over 65 percent of Myanmar’s territory as of early 2025. However, underlying tensions persist, threatening the revolutionary coalition’s cohesion.
Prominent issues include territorial clashes between the KIA and TNLA, governance-related protests in multi-ethnic regions like Kutkai, internal splits within the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and the AA’s contentious oppressions of the Rohingya and other marginalized populations in their controlled areas.
Ideologically, Myanmar’s EAOs differ considerably, complicating prospects for sustained unity beyond shared opposition to military rule. The KIA emphasizes ethnic self-determination and federal democracy rooted in Kachin identity and liberation theology-inspired Christian values.
Conversely, the AA promotes a secular, ethnically defined vision of autonomy termed the “Way of Rakhita.” AA’s commander-in-chief, Twan Mrat Naing, publicly stated AA’s goal of establishing a unitary, one-party-ruled state guided by social democratic principles.
The TNLA integrates ethnic nationalism with socialist elements, while the MNDAA advocates localized autonomy for ethnic Chinese (Kokang). In contrast, the KNLA and Karenni Army (KA) align closely with the NUG’s vision for federal democracy, emphasizing equal ethnic rights and democratic governance.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), pursues a political vision fundamentally rooted in communist ideology, aiming to transform Myanmar’s governance structure comprehensively.
Due to its clandestine operations and Myanmar’s complex political context, explicit, detailed statements from the PLA regarding its current objectives remain limited. However, historical context and recent activities suggest pragmatic adaptation. PLA’s operations intend to build widespread resistance rather than strictly enforcing ideological purity.
Reports indicate the PLA has consciously moved away from previous doctrinaire approaches—such as the “ultra-leftism” that weakened the CPB historically—and now prioritizes strategic adaptability and alliances with other anti-junta entities, including the NUG and ethnic militias like the KIA and the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
While maintaining operational independence from the NUG, the PLA has strategically accepted logistical support, exemplified by donation channels like NUG Pay, indicating tactical alignment with broader revolutionary efforts without fully endorsing the NUG’s federal democratic framework.
While current tactical cooperation against the junta is robust, historical inter-ethnic rivalries, ideological disparities, and resource competition pose significant challenges to maintaining and consolidating revolutionary achievements in the long term.
PRMI: The situation in Kachin State is particularly tense. What is going on there?
PWL: Kachin State has emerged as a pivotal battleground in Myanmar’s escalating civil war, characterized by complex dynamics involving the military junta and various EAOs. The state’s strategic significance derives from its proximity to the Chinese border, abundant natural resources—including jade, rare earth minerals, and timber—and the KIA, one of Myanmar’s strongest EAOs.
Following the 2021 coup, the KIA intensified its opposition to the junta by aligning closely with the broader anti-military movement, notably providing training and arms support to the PDFs.
By 2024, the KIA had secured significant territorial gains, capturing over 200 military bases and 14 towns, including critical border locations such as Kan Pike Tee and Pangwa, formerly part of the junta-aligned Kachin Special Region One.
By late November 2024, KIA-led forces had successfully overrun this region, significantly weakening the junta’s northern defenses and dismantling the influence of the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) Border Guard Force (BGF).
Although the conflict in Kachin State primarily involves clashes between the KIA and the junta, underlying inter-ethnic tensions and shifting alliances complicate the broader picture. The KIA, representing the Kachin (Jingpo), a confederation of six ethnic subgroups, has long been the dominant force in the region. However, its territorial expansion into multi-ethnic areas has sparked friction with neighboring armed groups, particularly the TNLA, which represents the Ta’ang (Palaung) ethnic group and operates mainly in northern Shan State.
In early 2025, tensions between the KIA and TNLA escalated into open conflict in Kutkai, a multi-ethnic town near the Kachin State border. These clashes arose despite earlier cooperation between the two groups as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (including the MNDAA) to expel junta forces. Disputes over territorial control led to public protests against TNLA governance, prompting mediation efforts by the KIA.
As of March 2025, reports indicated that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)—the political wing of the KIA—had begun negotiations with TNLA leadership and local communities to defuse tensions, signaling diplomatic efforts to avoid further escalation.
As KIA consolidates its territorial gains, Kachin State is increasingly shifting toward de facto autonomy. The KIO has established governance structures in captured territories and implemented health, education, and taxation systems.
Nevertheless, substantial challenges persist, including managing ethnic diversity in newly controlled areas, addressing deep-rooted poverty, and navigating China’s complex regional dominance.
Beijing has alternated between tacitly supporting EAOs to contain junta instability and advocating for ceasefires to protect its economic interests, particularly concerning rare earth mineral exports and infrastructure projects like the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port.
Thus, Kachin State exemplifies Myanmar’s broader fragmentation, illustrating how EAOs cooperate against the military junta while competing for territory and resources. The region also underscores the severe humanitarian crisis confronting civilians caught amid ongoing armed conflict.
Meanwhile, governance challenges persist elsewhere.
According to Myanmar Now, the TNLA informed local administrators in Mogok, Mandalay Region, a few weeks ago of its plan to form a militia to maintain town security. Each household must provide one militia member aged between 18 and 45. Administrators delivered this announcement, prompting significant local opposition. A resident stated, “We do not accept this… it appears mandatory… and they will likely use force to collect conscripts if people refuse,” adding that residents were preparing to submit a formal protest. Mogok fell under TNLA-led resistance control during the second phase of Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in July 2024.
Similarly, administrative actions by the MNDAA and TNLA in northern Shan State have heightened tensions with local communities.
Recently, residents of Hseni Township accused the MNDAA of coercing them into leasing their land for banana plantations at prices below market value, as reported by the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN). According to one resident, the MNDAA offered annual payments of K200,000 per acre in mountainous regions and K500,000 per acre in lowland areas, with payments scheduled every two years. “The MNDAA is already plowing our lands. We do not dare protest since they have arms,” the source explained. These incidents illustrate broader tensions between ethnic armed groups and civilian populations, complicating resistance efforts against the junta.
PRMI: What is the situation for the Rohingya population?
PWL: The fate of the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State remains dire, even as the military has lost control of the region to the AA. Rather than offering relief, the AA has continued the cycle of oppression, subjecting the Rohingya to systematic discrimination, property seizures, and accusations of collaborating with the military—tactics eerily reminiscent of the junta’s longstanding repression.
A particularly alarming development is the AA’s recent ban on the term “Rohingya” in its controlled areas, signaling a deepening effort to erase their identity. Rohingya rights activist Ro Nay San Lwin has warned that “Rohingya identity denial is a weapon of genocide.”
By branding the Rohingya as military collaborators, the AA not only isolates them from the ethnic Rakhine population but also legitimizes further crackdowns, echoing the military’s divide-and-conquer strategy. Despite the power shift, the Rohingya’s reality remains unchanged—persecuted, stateless, and trapped in a relentless cycle of oppression.
The international community has long condemned Rohingya’s persecution, but statements of concern have yet to be translated into meaningful action or protection. The AA’s treatment of the Rohingya serves as a stark reminder that unchecked ethnic nationalism can be just as oppressive as military rule. For the Rohingya, the fall of the junta in northern Rakhine has not brought liberation—only a new chapter in their struggle for survival and recognition.
PRMI: Late last year, China stepped up patrols on its border with Myanmar. What has been China’s role in this conflict? In February, the junta signed a series of economic agreements with Russia. How will these affect the fighting?
China’s involvement in Myanmar’s civil war is shaped by a mix of economic, strategic, and security concerns, particularly along their shared 2,185-kilometer border.
In late 2024, China increased patrols in response to escalating instability, including rebel advances by the AA and the KIA, which disrupted trade and threatened Chinese investments. Beijing conducted live-fire exercises in Yunnan Province to signal its determination to prevent further chaos and protect key projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), such as the Kyaukphyu port and oil and gas pipelines. These moves highlight China’s broader goal of maintaining stability along its border while safeguarding its economic interests.
China has pursued a dual-track approach, engaging both Myanmar’s military junta and EAOs to secure its position.
Initially, Beijing tolerated the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s October 2023 offensive (Operation 1027) because it targeted scam syndicates along the border, a shared concern.
However, as the resistance gained ground in 2024—capturing Lashio and threatening the junta’s stability—China pivoted to supporting the junta. This shift included diplomatic pressure on EAOs, mediating a ceasefire with the MNDAA in January 2025, and cutting electricity, internet, and trade to EAOs-held areas to force compliance.
China also formalized its security role by allowing private Chinese firms to operate in Myanmar following a series of attacks, including the October 2024 bombing of its Mandalay consulate.
While Beijing officially maintains a noninterference policy, its actions—including supplying the junta with fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including the CH-3A armed drones, mediating conflicts, and imposing economic measures—demonstrate active involvement.
China fears Myanmar’s fragmentation could jeopardize its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and increase Western influence via the NUG, which, despite supporting the One China policy, remains distrusted by Beijing.
However, China’s support for the junta risks alienating Myanmar’s populace and resistance forces, who see it as enabling a failing regime. This could complicate China’s long term influence in Myanmar, leaving it to navigate a delicate balance between maintaining stability and managing opposition from various factions.
PRMI: With Trump in the White House, international alliances and blocks are being disrupted. How will the regime and opposition need to recalibrate themselves in this new situation?
PWL: With Donald Trump assuming his second term of U.S. presidency on January 20, 2025, his administration’s transactional, unilateral, and China-focused foreign policy reshapes the strategic calculations for Myanmar’s junta (State Administration Council, SAC) and opposition groups, including the NUG and EAOs.
Given Trump’s historical disinterest in Myanmar—evident from his earlier term—the SAC may perceive reduced pressure from Washington, potentially weakening enforcement of sanctions or human rights advocacy. Conversely, opposition forces must adapt to diminished direct U.S. support, compelling them to seek alternative funding and logistical assistance through regional allies and diaspora networks.
The junta will likely leverage diminished U.S. engagement to solidify its domestic and international position. Trump’s disregard for multilateral frameworks like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could further fracture regional consensus on Myanmar, enabling the SAC to exploit divisions within the bloc.
Additionally, deeper engagement with Russia—highlighted by recent economic agreements involving drones, nuclear technology, and trade—and enhanced dependence on China might offer temporary stability but risks transforming Myanmar into a vassal state. However, ongoing territorial losses and widespread domestic resistance remain fundamental challenges for the junta, which Trump’s hands-off approach will not resolve.
Meanwhile, the opposition, consisting of the NUG, PDFs, and prominent EAOs such as the KIA and AA, faces the complex task of recalibrating their strategy under reduced U.S. involvement.
Trump’s anticipated cuts to humanitarian aid and diplomatic support require them to diversify sources of external backing, possibly through clandestine aid channels facilitated by India, Thailand, or other regional partners wary of Chinese dominance.
Additionally, heightened U.S.-China tensions under Trump could offer opportunities for resistance groups to position themselves as proxies in broader geopolitical rivalries, although balancing this strategy against China’s sensitivities will be challenging.
Ultimately, Trump’s presidency introduces significant unpredictability, compelling both sides to navigate carefully between local imperatives and shifting international dynamics, with China’s influence remaining decisive in determining Myanmar’s trajectory.
PRMI: In the early days after the coup, textile and medical workers, particularly the youth, played a significant role in resisting the military takeover. What role do they now play?
PWL: In the immediate aftermath of Myanmar’s February 1, 2021, military coup, textile workers and medical professionals—particularly younger individuals—emerged as leaders within the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), significantly disrupting junta operations through widespread strikes and public demonstrations.
By March 2025, the nature of their resistance had substantially evolved, shaped by escalating conflict, severe economic hardship, and oppressive junta policies like forced conscription.
Although large-scale protests have diminished mainly, both groups continue to contribute critically to the opposition in more decentralized and pragmatic ways, driven by survival rather than symbolic protest.
Textile workers, initially instrumental in crippling Myanmar’s garment industry through mass walkouts and confrontations with security forces (notably in Yangon’s Hlaingthaya Industrial Zone in 2021), have faced severe economic setbacks due to international brand withdrawals, factory closures, and rampant inflation.
By 2025, many of these predominantly female workers were unemployed or displaced, often forced to migrate internally or abroad (notably to Thailand) to escape economic despair and forced conscription laws targeting women aged 18–27.
Yet, even in diminished numbers, textile workers now provide indirect but essential support to resistance groups. Many produce uniforms and medical supplies in resistance-controlled areas or clandestinely channel funds and intelligence to revolutionary forces, thus continuing to sustain the revolution’s logistical needs and morale despite ongoing junta repression.
Teachers and medical professionals, having sparked a powerful symbolic resistance through the CDM’s “white coat revolution,” similarly shifted from public defiance to guerrilla-style healthcare provision by 2025.
After junta forces militarized public hospitals, arresting hundreds of healthcare workers and driving others underground, these medics adapted by establishing secret clinics in urban centers and offering frontline medical assistance in conflict zones, treating civilians and resistance fighters amid severe resource constraints.
Young doctors and medical students now actively train resistance members in emergency care and coordinate crucial medical supply networks, often at significant personal risk.
Although many educators and healthcare professionals fled abroad to continue their education and livelihoods or avoid arrest and conscription, their remaining counterparts provided indispensable support, highlighting the resilience and sacrifice underpinning the ongoing revolution against military rule.
PRMI: What is the mood of Myanmar’s youth now – do they see a way out?
PWL: Myanmar’s youth are navigating an increasingly perilous landscape defined by relentless military oppression and a deepening revolutionary and civil war.
Activating the forced conscription law in February 2024 has exacerbated their sense of entrapment, stripping away educational opportunities, employment, and stability opportunities. Recently, the junta has intensified its surveillance efforts through the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS), which integrates AI, facial recognition, CCTV analysis, and biometric data to track and target young activists and revolutionaries.
Many young people feel their futures have been stolen, their aspirations replaced by the ever-present threat of forced military service, arbitrary detention, or violence. Yet, despite these dire circumstances, resistance remains steadfast. Some youths seek refuge in territories controlled by EAOs, while others embark on perilous journeys to escape the country.
Those who stay behind must balance fear with defiance, finding ways to evade recruitment, support the resistance, or engage in underground activism.
The junta’s sweeping conscription efforts, targeting men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27, have triggered widespread resistance and evasion tactics across Myanmar. Many youths have fled to opposition-held “liberated areas” in Kachin, Chin, and Karenni States, seeking refuge or joining armed resistance groups.
Wealthier families often resort to bribing local officials, paying substantial sums to secure exemptions—a privilege unavailable to poorer youths, who face higher risks of abduction and forced conscription. Others have gone into hiding within Myanmar, depending on sympathetic communities for protection.
Meanwhile, large numbers have opted to actively join the ranks of the PDFs and EAOs, interpreting the regime’s reliance on forced conscription as evidence of desperation rather than strength.
However, despite these acts of defiance, the military’s control tightens. The junta has implemented severe internal movement restrictions, employing checkpoints, informant networks, and telecom blackouts to prevent youths from fleeing.
Escape routes beyond Myanmar’s borders are also rapidly closing. Authorities have banned men from leaving the country for employment and tightened passport controls, and neighboring countries, especially Thailand, Laos, and Malaysia, have dramatically increased deportations of Myanmar nationals.
Educational opportunities abroad, once a potential lifeline, have grown scarce as scholarships diminish and the regime erects financial barriers for students seeking overseas education. As options dwindle, Myanmar’s youth increasingly face three stark choices: fight, flee, or accept an uncertain future under military rule.
Further intensifying the crisis, the junta’s surprise announcement of nationwide compulsory military service has sparked widespread panic. Although the regime had previously floated this idea for at least two years, it officially confirmed in 2024 that it would begin enforcing the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, enacted initially under the previous military regime State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) that ruled the country from 1997 to 2011 but left dormant until now.
In an interview with BBC Burmese Service, junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun elaborated on the plan, estimating that around 50,000 people of military age would be conscripted annually, starting after Myanmar’s traditional New Year celebrations on April 17, 2024.
He indicated that further guidelines would soon be released and claimed that conscription would be “merit-based,” adding, “Fighting is not the only way to serve your country. For example, a computer hacker can defend it from cyber-attacks.”
The resistance has reacted strongly to the junta’s announcement. In a statement released by the NUG, the group declared that the “terrorist military” has no legitimacy to enact or enforce such laws, asserting that the public has no obligation to comply. The NUG also warned that those facilitating conscription would face “serious punishment,” although it did not clarify the specifics.
Additionally, three activist groups released a joint statement urging neighboring countries to prepare for a mass exodus of young people fleeing forced conscription. Evidence suggests that this exodus may have already begun. According to Dawei Watch, residents reported that the number of crossings from Kawthaung Township in the Tanintharyi Region to Thailand has doubled. Some footage from outside the Thai embassy in Yangon showed lengthy queues of people waiting to apply for visas. The embassy acknowledged in an announcement “a recent increase in the number of visa applications,” though it did not specify precisely when this surge began.
Even for those who manage to escape, safety is far from guaranteed. The 2024 tragedy at Bangkok’s Assumption University, where a Burmese student lost his life in a reckless driving incident, underscores the precarious existence of exiled youth. Having fled the junta’s brutality only to meet a tragic fate abroad, his story epitomizes the harsh reality of life in exile—where survival does not equate to security.
His family’s ongoing fight for justice highlights the broader struggles of Myanmar’s displaced youth, who, even after escaping oppression at home, face systemic neglect, exploitation, and violence abroad. Meanwhile, as borders tighten and deportations increase—over 144,000 Myanmar nationals were deported from Thailand in late 2024 alone—the dream of a fresh start is slipping further out of reach.
For many, the choice is stark: fight, flee, or remain trapped in a country where the military offers them nothing but suffering. While some cling to the hope that the resistance’s momentum will ultimately bring down the junta, others see no viable path forward, their futures consumed by fear, displacement, and uncertainty.
What we (PRMI -then ISA) said in 2021
It is understandable and correct that many are taking up arms to combat the Tatmadaw, with a stepping up of guerilla struggle particularly in those areas where the ethnic forces have a base. Given the anger of the population and the army’s lack of a social base such a struggle can go further than that in the past…
Workers and youth must have the right to self defence. It should be organized not by relying on the NUG or heads of the ethnic forces who are motivated more by their own interests, but controlled democratically by workers, youth and the poor in their own interests.
However, the defeat of the Tatmadaw needs a working class-led political campaign that guarantees the right of self-determination to all national minorities, the redistribution of land to all poor farmers and their families, proper wages and trade union rights to workers. This would forge a clear unity between the workers, poor farmers and ethnic minorities in this struggle.
The NUG/NLD, notwithstanding their recent turn to a more radical position under the pressure of the mass struggle against the military, remains pro-capitalist and will not take suh measures …
If the working class and poor in Myanmar was to organize around such a programme at the head of the struggle, it would have tremendous support amongst the global working class and gain real, genuine international solidarity. It would act as a tremendous beacon to the working class of China and Russia undermining the power of even these authoritarian regimes to intervene.
If the working class of Myanmar was to go on the offensive, by escalating the struggle with an indefinite general strike combined with democratic controlled armed defence and a policy directed to win over or neutralise soldiers. In this way, it could force the disbanding of the Tatmadaw, opening the way for a revolutionary constituent assembly.
…Delegates should be elected to represent all those currently involved in resisting the Tatmadaw — workers, medical workers, students, youth, poor farmers and the ethnic minorities should all send their own representatives.
Only in such a way, with the working class and independent trade unions taking the lead, can a genuine democratic system without any compromise with the military be established. A new constitution, and a new government that would result would be one that actually represents the democratic, social, economic and national rights of the workers, poor farmers and youth in Myanmar, in a genuinely free and democratic socialist Myanmar.