The presidential elections are fast approaching in Côte d’Ivoire, and the situation continues to heat up, especially since the announcement of the incumbent president Alassane Ouattara’s candidacy for yet another term. Voices of opposition were already mounting before the announcement, and popular disapproval of this new candidacy continues to stir unrest. But why does Ouattara feel compelled to run again, he who had announced his withdrawal in March 2020, before backtracking in August of the same year? Several reasons explain these spectacular U-turns.
The ashes of the social cutbacks of the 1990s
First, we must go back to Ouattara’s entry onto the Ivorian political scene in 1991, when he became the country’s very first Prime Minister — a position that had never existed in the structure of the country’s ruling class since independence. His appointment by authoritarian President Houphouët-Boigny was initially aimed at reviving the economy, but it ended in disaster due to the implementation of very damaging structural adjustment programs.
Social cutbacks at the time spared no sector — from education to health, housing, and agriculture, with cash crops bought from farmers at dirt-cheap prices. Student allowances were scrapped — transport passes, meal tickets, and university housing. Add to this the privatization of water and electricity sectors, of hospitals and universities. It was also during Ouattara’s tenure as Prime Minister that a residence permit was introduced for ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) nationals.
The record of the armed rebellion
Ouattara’s time as Prime Minister left a negative mark on Ivorian society as he was seen as the main face of the IMF diktats and austerity. Later, after Houphouët-Boigny’s death, Ouattara was barred from the presidential race under the divisive ideology of ‘ivoirité’ promoted by Houphouët-Boigny’s successor, Henri Konan Bédié.
In this context, Ouattara was able to instrumentalize the discrimination of the northern populations — both Ivoirians from the north and nationals of neighboring countries — for his own political ambitions. His narrative was that he was being excluded from the presidential race due to his northern origins. This discourse mobilized these populations around Ouattara and even led them to take up arms, using Burkina Faso and Mali as rear bases between 2002 and 2011. At the time, Blaise Compaoré ruled Burkina Faso with absolute power.
During the rebellion, both Burkina and Mali were zones of investment for some warlords — hotels, luxury apartments, bars, and entire neighborhoods were built. Some leading cadres in Ouattara’s party also accumulated wealth through looting in the rebel-held zones — export crops, underground resources, and raids on BCEAO bank branches in the occupied central-north.
When Ouattara came to power in April 2011 after the fall of outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo, the warlords and some Burkinabè auxiliaries were integrated into the Ivorian military hierarchy. But Compaoré’s fall in 2014 triggered a crisis between the two countries. First, the Burkinabè population accused Abidjan of harboring Compaoré and his former ministers.
The Ivorian regime then carried out a purge within its military, eliminating or imprisoning Burkinabè soldiers suspected of being close to those who had overthrown Compaoré. Burkinabè civilians living in Côte d’Ivoire who supported Compaoré’s ousting were also targeted. Finally, since Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali withdrew from the ECOWAS, the Ouattara regime has intensified its repression of nationals from these countries — simply because they have withdrawn their support and are unlikely to vote for him in the upcoming elections.
Today, we hear Ouattara’s supporters say of these nationals that “Côte d’Ivoire is not their home.” Yet when in opposition and during his early years in power, Ouattara’s forces facilitated the registration of thousands of nationals from these very countries on the electoral roll in order to create an “electoral fodder”.
The betrayal of the poor in the North
Beyond this, the pro-rich policies of the Ouattara government have fueled deep disillusionment among northern populations. For instance, neighborhoods evicted in Abidjan had previously been used to shelter armed rebels in 2011 before the ‘April assault’ (the final offensive by pro-Ouattara forces that ousted Gbagbo after the 2010 electoral crisis). Indeed, these areas used to house a large share of Ouattara’s voter base.
These evictions are not only criticized because they leave people homeless, but also because the “compensations” are directed toward property owners rather than the tenants themselves. Some owners, for example, tell their tenants: “Don’t pay rent for two or three months, but then you must vacate the house.” In these conditions these landlords come across as generous while in reality, they receive large sums of money for reconstruction, whereas the tenants are left behind.
The deterioration of relations with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
In addition, the economic role of Sahel Alliance countries in Côte d’Ivoire cannot be ignored. For example, 80% of goods imported by Mali and Burkina Faso pass through the port of Abidjan. Niger also plays a vital role in supplying livestock to Ivorian markets. The government will never admit the negative impact of this diplomatic crisis, but across the country, there’s a noticeable spike in prices for products that used to come from these countries.
Moreover, the “security threat” argument used by Ouattara to justify his candidacy doesn’t hold water. It is under his rule that we have seen Kalashnikov assaults in Abidjan. Many young men recruited during the rebellion, disillusioned by his governance, have deserted the army and still roam the country. It is evident that the majority of the candidates for official or clandestine immigration are from the north — the heartland of his electoral base.
The fear of accountability after power
On top of numerous broken campaign promises, the Ouattara government has also been responsible for a record level of public fund embezzlement. From inflated infrastructure project costs to funds meant for basic social services — water, electricity, education, and healthcare — public money has been diverted often with impunity and in full view of the public.
Ouattara fears losing power because he doesn’t want to be held accountable. The exclusion of serious contenders such as Laurent Gbagbo, Tidjane Thiam, Guillaume Soro, or Charles Blé Goudé is no coincidence — it is a strategy to maintain power and avoid legal consequences.
Yet what the regime would fear the most today is the organization of a socialist opposition movement that could unify and channel the frustrations of the desperate youth, the evicted families, the unemployed, and underpaid workers. Ouattara knows that the people are seething with anger, and even without a catchy slogan or demand, they are ready to take to the streets — all they need is a spark, and the ideas passing through their minds will flow.
Moving beyond legalistic platitudes
As the elections near, Ouattara’s only weapon is the repression of public demonstrations. It is therefore necessary to organize well-prepared neighborhood gatherings before launching a nationwide call to action. The “Trop c’est trop” movement (“Enough is enough”) initiated by Gbagbo’s party can gain traction if it is to expand beyond traditional political formations — the PPA-CI and the PDCI — to appeal to broader sections of the population.
The protest against a fourth term for Ouattara on Saturday, August 9, which drew tens of thousands of people on the streets of Abidjan, including some unions and civil society groups, shows the potential for a movement that roots itself amongst working class and poor people and gives voice to their real needs.
The participation, in that march, of working class sectors in struggle –such as the dismissed workers of the Cocody municipal council fighting for their unpaid entitlements– indicates that the anger goes way beyond the opposition to a fourth term for Ouattara; it expresses the deep social crisis gripping the country.
Yet Thiam’s PDCI and Gbagbo’s African Peoples’ Party – Ivory Coast (PPA-CI), who had together called for that protest, are no reliable political vehicles for leading such a struggle. Thiam is a rich businessman, former CEO of the Swiss bank ‘Credit Suisse’, and is well connected to Western imperialist powers.
As for Gbagbo, despite occasionally reasserting some popular social demands (like free education for all children and universal health coverage), his record in power should dispel illusions that he is there to offer a real break to the politics of repression, corruption and elite enrichment. While wrapping himself in pan-Africanist rhetoric, Gbagbo’s years in office did not free Côte d’Ivoire from the grip of French multinationals, the CFA franc, or the dictates of the IMF– instead, his anti-Western speeches have often masked compromises with those very same powers. When challenged, Gbagbo also leaned on exclusionary politics, and on repression of student and workers’ movements that threatened his authority.
Besides, the official opposition front tends to make the constitutional ‘illegality’ of Ouattara’s fourth term and the exclusion of rival candidates from the elections the central issue of their mobilisation. While these are undoubtedly important questions, we can’t narrow the terrain of resistance to electoral technicalities.
Build a broader movement on a militant programme
Instead of just harping on the unconstitutionality of a fourth term, what we need is a militant program that puts the demands of struggling workers and youth centre-stage, and give them a central role in the development and building of the movement. This could be done, for example, through the organisation of local assemblies and the election of grassroots committees in workplaces, schools, and working-class neighbourhoods.
For example, we know that the social front is bound to kick off with the start of the school year, due to the ongoing dispute over bonuses, with teachers still on high alert. The government won’t respond favourably. The opposition must seize this moment by making concrete proposals to support the teachers in struggle. Territorial administration workers, healthcare staff, and port workers have also spent the last five years demanding better living and working conditions — now is the time to boldly put their demands forward in the context of the “Trop c’est trop” movement.
Our group, Militant-Côte d’Ivoire, wants to play a role in this dynamic, by reaching out to these social layers and by promoting their demands during the pre-election period.
We must also rally nationals from Sahel Alliance countries. Between four and six million Burkinabè and Malians live in Côte d’Ivoire. They know how involved the Ouattara regime was in the economic sanctions that hit their countries. They have not forgotten that Abidjan harbored the former regimes that were overthrown. We must talk to them — this is a chance to discuss the current inter-imperialist conflicts in our region. Together, we could assess the implications of their rulers’ growing ties with Russia. It would also be an opportunity to explain that Russian imperialism, nor more than French imperialism, won’t bring anything concretely positive to the people of these countries.