By Walter Chambers 5 December 2024
The suffering caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent conflict has been pushed out of the global headlines by the horrific genocide in Gaza, but it is no less horrific. The number of dead and wounded, both military and civilian, now far exceeds that from the inter-ethnic and civil wars which swept the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia following the restoration of capitalism in the 1990s.
There are still over 10 million Ukrainian refugees from the war either in Europe or displaced internally. Nine hundred thousand Russians have also fled their country, either as opponents of the war, or for fear of being conscripted into the army. After the initial warm welcome, now many face precarious work, sky-high housing costs and inflation on top of their worry about friends and relatives still at home.
Whole cities have been razed to the ground by the incessant bombing and artillery fire. Recent weeks have seen mass drone and missile waves as Russian forces attempt to deprive Ukrainian cities of power and heating as its long, cold winter sets in.
A larger burden is borne by women, who have extra work as the men are drafted, and even more frighteningly, facing a massive increase in gender-based violence as men brutalised by war return home. Already over 100 Russian women have been murdered by returning soldiers. The Ukrainian government estimates that nearly a half of its population will experience some form of mental distress after the war and it lacks sufficient resources to deal with the crisis.
International consequences
And of course globally, the war has dramatically increased tensions and polarisation, with a huge increase in military expenditure in all major countries. The war in Ukraine and genocidal attacks on Gaza have taken the headlines, but they have escalated the likelihood of conflicts elsewhere including in Sudan, Myanmar, the coups in the Sahel, war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and most recently the new outbreak of war in Aleppo. The use of North Korean troops by Russia raised tensions in the Korean peninsular, another factor pushing the South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to launch his failed coup d’etat.
The decision by outgoing US President Joe Biden to allow the use of western provided missiles within Russia itself raises the danger of a further escalation of the fighting. Their use in Bryansk and Kursk was quickly followed by the Kremlin’s use of a medium range ballistic missile, albeit without a warhead, to attack Dnepro in central Ukraine.
Current situation at the front
Although Russian troops have made some gains in East Ukraine in recent weeks, the Institute for the Study of War describe them as “unconfirmed” or “marginal” and reports that the offensive it has been waging since March 2024 with the aim of capturing Pokrovsk has “yet to make operationally significant advances in either direction.” Pokrovsk is a town with a pre-war population of 60.000, a key strategic block preventing the capture of the larger cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and thus the whole Donetsk region.
The reality, despite claims by some lefts who echo the Russian regime’s propaganda who say “the Ukrainians have lost many of the gains they made in 2022” is that since then the Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian troops, based on information provided by the ‘Institute for the Study of War’, remains in the range of 87,000 +/- 2000 square kilometers – about 18%. The recent small gains by Russia have been exaggerated by Zelensky to step up pressure on Western leaders to provide more weapons and have been offset by the nearly thousand square kilometers occupied by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia.
Area occupied by Russia (from left to right) 1: end of March 2022 2:end of 2023 3:end of October 2024.
This confirms the prediction first made by this author in May 2022 that the war was becoming “a war of brutal attrition”. Increasingly huge numbers of weapons are thrown by each side, the only result being the death of tens of thousands of soldiers such as those in Bakhmut’s “meat grinder” and complete devastation of cities without either side making any real gains.
None of the weapons supplied by the west, each time increasing the firepower of the Ukrainian army, starting with the HIMARS, Abram tanks, then F16 fighters have been “game-changers”. Now most defence experts agree that though the use of western missiles in Russia itself risks a dangerous response from the Kremlin they are not likely to have a major effect. This war has been dominated by the use of drones, the majority of which on the Ukrainian side have been domestically produced.
Is this a turning point in the war?
Christopher Lockwood, European editor of The Economist wrote recently that the war could end in 2025 as both sides are close to exhaustion and the backers of each side would prefer to see the fighting stop. Is this realistic?
With the war now in a stalemate, with neither side making significant gains despite huge human and economic costs, the possibility that either side can win an outright victory can be practically ruled out. The danger of escalation into an open Russia-NATO war even raising the prospect of a nuclear conflict cannot be completely excluded, but this would almost certainly see mass opposition develop globally, and provoke splits within the Russian regime, while western unity is undermined by the electoral victory of NATO-sceptic and right populist forces in several countries.
Whether the war drags on possibly at a lower intensity as the sides exhaust their reserves, or a settlement to “freeze” the war allowing the sides to rebuild their forces for the war to break out again in the future is negotiated depends on the balance of social, including class forces, on all sides of the conflict.
Increasingly talk about the possibility of negotiations is turning from “not possible” to “if” and now “when”.
Russia reaching its limits
But a sober assessment of the real situation is necessary. Some on the left argue that Russia’s war economy, its population being three times larger than Ukraine’s, and its apparent recent headway on the front make it possible for the new capitalist, imperialist Russia to stand up to the combined might of Western imperialism. This not only denies Ukraine’s right to self-determination but is also wishful thinking.
The Kremlin’s use of troops from North Korea, as well as fighters recruited from Nepal, India, Sri Lanka and Yemen is a sign of desperation. Russian losses at the front are very high, and last week the General in charge of the “Southern group” in the Donetsk region was removed from his post for exaggerating gains around Chasiv Yar. Military bloggers say the names of villages he claimed to have taken were simply “synonyms for lies and unjustified losses”.
Again reports are appearing of troops refusing orders or deserting – in one case, earlier a whole regiment of 1000 troops, including senior officers was reported missing. Attempts to recruit new soldiers compete with a serious shortage of labour, including for the production of weapons. The Kremlin fears new protests and serious difficulties if it implements a further compulsory mobilisation. During President Putin’s announcement of the use of a Ballistic missile to attack Ukraine, the price of air tickets out of the country increased tenfold, illustrating the potential problems!
International sanctions have not worked. The attempt to restrict Russia’s oil and gas revenues has had the opposite effect – they are on course in 2024 to be 28% higher than 2023, and 25% higher than in 2021. to reach $128billion in 2024 – a 56% increase from 2022. Western imperialism’s support for Israel has played a large part in this. Saudi Arabia wants to reduce the oil price to increase its market share (as Iran and Russia have higher production costs) but the instability in the Middle East has limited its success. Any attack on Iran’s oilfields would increase the price dramatically, boosting Russia’s income. At the same time Russia is importing the high-tech chips it needs from US manufacturers through third parties.
Russia’s stagnant economy
Russia is now a war economy, but not a strong economy. Next year the defence budget will increase by 25% to $142billion. Security related expenditure will consume over 40% of the federal budget. Huge sums are required to finance the troops in Ukraine itself, and regional governments have to pay huge sign-up bonuses for new recruits. Moscovites who sign up are promised a first-year income of 5.2 million rubles – $52000.
But the real drain of resources is to support and increase arms production. The replacement of defence minister Sergey Shoigu in May accompanied by the arrest of at least twelve generals by the economist Andrey Belousov was an attempt to reduce corruption and make the defence sector more efficient.
But now economists talk of the slowdown of the Russian economy. It faces massive shortages, not least a deficit of workers resulting from army recruitment and mobilisation, the flight abroad of anti-war Russians, and reduced migration from Central Asia. The labour shortage is anywhere between 2 and 5 million, in addition to serious deficits of production equipment, parts, and raw materials. By pumping money into the defence industry, the government is simply fuelling inflation with no accompanying increase in production.
After a fall in GDP in 2022, Russia recovered in 2023 with a 3.6% growth. This year though growth is slowing and the IMF forecasts it will be 1.3% in 2025. Russia’s Central Bank says it may even fall to 0.25% next year.
Money supply (M2) has increased 66% since 2022 fuelling inflation, which the Central Bank recognises has reached an annual figure of 10%, far higher than its 4% target. In October it increased its key rate to 21%.
This has created a new wave of discontent within the elite. The Kremlin used assassination and prison to deal with the hardliners after the Wagner revolt, and sackings and criminal charges against the military hierarchy. Now it faces open opposition from key oligarchs even including Sergey Chemezov, powerful head of the state-owned weapons and technology corporation “Rostec”. Attacking the Central Bank he warned “the new rate rise will cause the “bankruptcy of most enterprises”. Even state-owned oil-pipeline monopoly “Transneft” has said it will cut major investment projects after the corporate tax it will have to pay doubled to 40%.
Now some companies are not paying wages on time – in the last week alone housing workers in Bryansk, miners in Kuzbas, workers in a trading company in Rostov, construction workers in Ulyanovsk, and even footballers in Moscow have taken legal action over the non-payment of wages. Official statistics show a 44% increase in workplace disputes in the first nine months of this year. Discontent too is reflected in continued protests by the relatives of the mobilised, residents who have lost their homes in Kursk and others in the far-east complaining about new attacks on democratic rights. These protests are still at a very low level, but they indicate a new dynamic that could develop as the economy stagnates.
Change in mood in Ukraine
The tone of statements from the Ukrainian leadership has markedly changed, particularly after the victory of Trump. In 2022, Zelensky signed a decree banning the conduct of any negotiations with Russia as long as Putin was President. On November 16 this year, speaking to Ukraine’s public broadcaster ‘Suspilne’, he said “We must do everything to end this war next year through diplomatic means”. Although he believes Putin himself does not want peace, he has to break out of international isolation. Serious negotiations, he said, needed the participation of the US President, by which he meant Donald Trump.
This reflects the changes taking place in Ukraine itself, as well as the recognition of a change in the US’ position after Trump’s election.
The Russian invasion did terrible damage to the Ukrainian economy in 2022 – GDP fell by 29%, but is now experiencing modest growth based on rebuilding the destruction caused by the incessant barrage of Russian missiles, on transport, and of course on arms manufacturing.
Zelensky speaks of the unity of the whole nation. The reality is that the welcome door has been opened for business, mainly western to use Ukraine’s reconstruction as a golden opportunity to make profits supported by western ‘donors’ who demand deregulation, privatisation and increasing energy tariffs, while the government continues to undermine trade union rights. It is the working class who suffer wages eaten away by inflation.
A typical example of big business hypocrisy hangs outside ArcelorMittal’s Kryvyi Rih steel plant – a banner saying “together for victory”. Many of its workers have been killed, and those still working haven’t had a pay-rise for 2 years during which inflation has hit 35%, but other parts of the Mittal empire have been happily buying Russian coal and oil, contributing billions to Russia’s war effort.
Initial celebration after the Ukrainian incursion into the Russian Kursk region has quickly receded as fighting has been difficult and at very high human cost. The mood and morale of Ukrainians is still very contradictory. For the first time since 2022, polls indicate the number prepared to tolerate the war as long as necessary has fallen to 38%.The army is also facing increasing difficulties in mobilising troops. At the same time the number who think that “Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible” has grown and is now a majority.
These statistics though underestimate the anger revealed when the war is brought home in the most brutal way. After a missile attack on Lviv in September which left a whole family under the rubble, residents blamed Zelensky for being more interested in playing politics rather than keeping people safe. Relatives of those at the front since the beginning continue to protest about conditions.
The Lviv attack coincided with a widespread reorganisation of the government by Zelensky. Having sacked the relatively popular Valerii Zaluzhnyi as Commander-in Chief earlier in the year, in early September Zelensky sacked seven more government ministers including Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, who he blamed for not energetically demanding weapons. The changes though have simply “moved the chairs around”, narrowing the circle around Zelensky himself.
Support for Zelensky, despite widespread criticism, is still relatively high but has fallen from 90+% in 2022 to 59%. As the Parliamentary election due in 2023 and Presidential election this year were both postponed, pressure is growing for elections to be held next year. Zelensky could well face serious competition from candidates such as Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who is presenting himself as a strong military leader.
Western support waning
Globally, support for Ukraine remains high if contradictory – in a poll by the Economist and Globespan across 29 countries – 54% wanted a Ukrainian win against 20% who supported Russia. Many though believe that Ukraine cannot win, and that it is time to start negotiating. Undoubtedly US imperialism’s support for Netanyahu while simultaneously backing Ukraine has added to confusion, and forced many people to question the dominant narratives and examine more critically what forces and agenda lie behind the ‘Ukrainian side’.
If in 2022 solidarity with Ukrainians was seen as a priority, now other issues take precedence. In one country after another right-wing populists and NATO sceptics have been winning elections and other governments have been reducing support. The latest example is Romania —which shares a 613-kilometer border with Ukraine— where in recent parliamentary elections, Russian-friendly nationalist parties saw a significant surge, and anti-NATO far-right populist Călin Georgescu emerged victorious in the first round of the presidential elections. Contrary to what some commentators suggest though, this phenomenon is more about the economic reality of the war hitting home, as well as the dissatisfaction with the establishment, than about the growth of ‘pro-Russian sentiments’ in Europe.
The US committed 108 billion euros to Ukraine in 2022, nothing in 2023 and 57 billion in 2024, of which just 30 billion, including a debt write-off of 5 billion actually goes to Ukraine. Increasingly, support for Ukraine has been to support its budget spending. With Germany cutting its military aid budget for next year by half, and difficult elections looming in which the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) could do well, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy is probably correct to say that “Aid could drop significantly from 2025”.
This combination of a stalemate on the front, diminishing resources on both sides, and war weariness means that negotiations over some form of peace deal, even though very difficult, are the most likely prospect in the next few months.
Significantly, for the first time the majority of both Ukrainians (52%) and of Russians (79%) are in favour of negotiations to find a peace deal.
Are negotiations possible?
According to the misnamed Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “Despite lofty declarations of support, Ukraine’s main backers are increasingly focused on laying the groundwork for Kyiv’s negotiations with Moscow.” Tony Brenton, former British Ambassador to Moscow recently said that officials in the Kremlin knew they were in a mess in Ukraine, and were keen to encourage a process of talks.
The next few weeks and maybe months are likely to be very difficult as both sides step up the fighting to strengthen their position before possible negotiations. There are as many as 25 proposed peace plans.
Quite what Trump’s plan will consist of is still not clear, except that he thinks he can threaten force to Russia and to withdraw support from Ukraine until they negotiate. China and Brazil, with their “Friends of Peace” platform unifying several ‘global south’ countries, call for an immediate ceasefire, de-escalation and negotiations.
Publicly, Zelensky refers to Ukraine’s ‘Ten-point Plan’ based on the complete withdrawal of all Russian troops from all territory including Crimea and a Security treaty. In the last week though he has said on Ukrainian radio: “For our part, we must do everything we can to ensure that this war ends next year. We have to end it by diplomatic means…We have to understand what the Russians want.” He went further in an interview with Sky News when he said: “If we want to stop the hot phase of the war, we need to take under the NATO umbrella the territory of Ukraine that we have under our control”. He has said further that Ukraine does not have the strength to take back the occupied territories by force, they would need to be returned “through diplomacy”.
Publicly, Russia continues to insist on the recognition of the whole of the four regions it has partially occupied, and that Ukraine should never join NATO. In private though, insiders say it can negotiate over regional boundaries and would accept some form of security arrangement for Ukraine as long as it remains neutral. Now the Russian press is reporting that the Kremlin PR gurus are preparing the narrative that it has won a victory.
The agreement between the Kremlin and North Korea has created a dent in the relationship between Russia and China, although this relationship remains strategically very important for both sides. Yet the fact that the Chinese regime has stayed publicly silent about North Korea’s new alliance with Russia and its military involvement in Ukraine suggests unease in Beijing. China is now trying to place some limits on its “no limits agreement” as it grows more wary about Russia’s reliability as a strong military partner.
While in several countries new NATO-sceptic forces have been building support, Russia itself has been losing allies in its “sphere of influence”. Apart from the major blow to Russian interests dealt in Syria, it has lost support in Armenia after its war with Azerbaijan, and faces serious anti-Russian protests in Georgia. In the pro-Russian enclave of Abkhazia in Georgia, a mass protest has forced the resignation of the government as a result of its promotion of Russian business. Belarusian president Lukashenko went so far this month as to say if Russia tries to annex Belarus, there will be war.
As China has been eating away at Russian influence in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan where just one month before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the regime relied on Russian forces to put down a mass uprising, President Tokayev snubbed Putin by speaking Kazakh at an official reception for the latter. Russia has also upset the Saudi regime by recruiting Houthi soldiers from Yemen. If Saudi Arabia was to increase oil production as it threatened last year, it would be disastrous for the Russian economy.
What would negotiations lead to?
The US no longer says there can be no agreement without Ukraine. Pressure will continue over the next months to force negotiations. Most likely the outcome will be the freezing of the conflict along the current frontlines, an agreement that Ukraine will not join NATO at least for many years, a security pact between Ukraine and a group of allies, and possibly a demilitarized zone along the current front.
Trump’s proposal to appoint retired General Keith Kellogg as Special Envoy to Ukraine and Russia makes this approach more likely. He has argued that Ukraine can be forced to the table by threatening to cut all arms supplies, and Russia could be encouraged by reducing sanctions.
In Ukraine naturally there will be anger at the feeling of being let down, at having to face the continued Russian occupation of parts of the country, and those still living in the occupied regions will be left living under authoritarian military rule. At the same time, many will be relieved that after three years of brutal war, a peace of sorts will be established, with the hope that reconstruction can take place.
But there should be no illusions. Just as after 2014, the Minsk Agreement and the Normandy Format only postponed a much more intense armed conflict to the future, any agreement at this time will only freeze the war for a time, ready for it to explode out again maybe in an even more brutal way as the conflicts between the imperialist powers of the world deepen over the next few years. At the same time western bodies who were prepared to “support Ukraine” to resist Russian imperialism will not be anywhere so keen to help with Ukraine’s reconstruction, unless it is to make huge profits.
But a period without direct military conflict gives the working class the opportunity to draw lessons and build an alternative. A working class alternative that understands that neither the national elite, nor the imperialist powers are capable, nor want to defend Ukraine’s right to self-determination.
At the same time the Russian working class will also be expected to pay for the consequences of the war. Already there are indications of a sharp change in mood taking place. While a Levada poll conducted in February still indicated majority support for the war, in September another poll said that 49% of Russians support the immediate withdrawal of troops and negotiations. In the aftermath of war as the soldiers return to find their jobs gone, inflation rampant and the government struggling to overcome the crises caused by the war economy, there will be a demand for answers. This will create an opportunity for building genuine working class resistance and in alliance with workers in Ukraine and internationally, a powerful force capable of defending the right to self determination and in opposition to capitalism and imperialism, the forces that continue to drag the world into war.