

## Reply to Nof's letter written by Serge Jordon and Valery

- 9.1. First, we want to sincerely thank Nof for her letter and express our regret over her decision to step away from the workgroup. We recognize that she has differences in approach regarding how this review should be conducted, which makes her departure all the more unfortunate, and we truly wish she had stayed engaged. Nof's insights on the issues at the heart of this review is something we value and want to benefit from, not sideline. We genuinely hope that she will continue contributing to these political discussions as the process unfolds.
- 9.2. That being said, we feel the need to clarify a few points raised in her letter. We do not share the characterization of this process as "rushed"—if anything, it is long overdue. For some of the comrades in the workgroup, the review contains issues that they have been trying to raise concerns about for many years, even before the split in the CWI in 2019.
- 9.3. We understand that some comrades originally from Israel-Palestine have concerns and questions about the political approach taken by the Project on these issues. These concerns need to be taken seriously and engaged with in depth. In that sense, it is unfortunate that Nof did not take the opportunity in our three workgroup meetings to clarify more concretely what these political concerns are, and that, having withdrawn from the workgroup, she will not be able to do so.
- 9.4. Although Nof notes the limited nature of the discussion on Gaza at the last 'delegate' meeting in December—at which the main political discussion covered many aspects of the consequences of Trump's election victory—we do not recall in her welcome contribution Nof raising her differences and concerns either. It is precisely because of the need for a fuller discussion that the political agenda at the next delegate meeting is devoted to the Palestine question.
- 9.5. But there is another level of concerns that we believe Nof significantly underestimates: for the past year and a half especially, many current PRMI comrades across multiple sections and entities have raised serious questions, doubts and criticisms about public materials, aspects of analysis, and programmatic positions from ISA and our former section in Israel-Palestine—including during last year's July school. Reducing these concerns to mere "misrepresentations", as abstract, or as stemming from a lack of proper reading of historical material, risks oversimplifying or diminishing the issues raised, and could come across as somewhat patronizing.
- 9.6. These concerns have come, first and foremost, from the layer of young comrades who have been the most intensively active in the global Gaza solidarity movement—hence for whom the need for a review has been felt in the most direct and urgent way. This is part of reckoning with the last 16 months of escalation to genocide and how that qualitative shift put our historic analysis and programme to the test. Understanding the discussions that have begun in sections/groups and internationally as merely "due to apparent difficulties in interventions and building"

is mistaken or at the very least extremely reductive, as it runs the danger of sidestepping broader political questions, including whether past analyses, perspectives and program have been sufficient or if they require changes in light of the dramatic developments that have taken place on the ground.

- 9.7. We of course agree that all comrades should strive to avoid misrepresentations in the course of these unfolding debates. However, we believe Nof may have misinterpreted certain comrades' positions herself—for instance, when she claims that the Belgian Congress resolution advocates “abandoning the right of self-determination for both national groups.”
- 9.8. It is not the task of this reply to defend in its entirety the resolution passed by the Belgian Congress, but if the review is to be of use, we have to reject the inaccurate representation of a position in order to raise false arguments against it.
- 9.9. Nowhere in the Belgian resolution does it advocate “abandoning the right of self-determination for both national groups.” On the contrary paragraph 74 explicitly states *“a revolutionary force in Israel ...should propose a revolutionary conference with democratically elected representatives of Palestinian workers and oppressed people - from all over historic Palestine, including, for example, elected representatives of Palestinian refugees from other countries - to discuss the right to self-determination of Palestinian workers and their families and, at the same time, that of the Israeli working class.”*
- 9.10. Nof also suggests that the Belgian resolution gives “uncritical support to any form of resistance”, even though the resolution calls *“to postpone the analysis of a Marxist approach to guerrilla warfare and the Palestinian resistance until the next session of the congress. To tackle this question, it will be crucial to restore the historical complexity of the Palestinian resistance.”* Nor does the resolution, as Nof claims, call for opposition to “protests by ordinary Israelis unless they have reached far-reaching conclusions on the question of Palestine liberation”.
- 9.11. Nof rightly states that the PRMI was never presented as an organization but rather as a process of discussion. We completely agree and remain committed to that approach. Yet, throughout her letter, she refers to “our” approach, “our” program, and “our” position. This raises the question: who does “our” then refer to? The CWI? The ISA? Our former section in Israel-Palestine? This framing risks creating an impression that our former organization’s position should be the default position of the PRMI, and that any critique of it is a deviation from the same. Yet if today, a thorough review is necessary, it is precisely because many comrades across the PRMI believe that we cannot simply transfer the program and approach of our former international into the foundations of the new Project. Truth be told, the PRMI, at this stage, does not have yet a unified, “our” position. That can only be the outcome of the review process —not its starting point.
- 9.12. For example, Nof argues that the discussion is not about how to make our position on the right to self-determination more accessible but about a “conscious

turn away from this approach.” In reality, there are different shades of opinion on this inside the PRMI, and these need to be voiced and properly discussed. Similarly, she expresses concern that some comrades seem to be shifting away from “fundamentals.” That is a political opinion to which she is fully entitled—just as comrades who allegedly want to push the discussion in this direction are. If we are serious about an open and honest debate, the parameters of the discussion cannot be arbitrarily limited in advance.

9.13. This does not mean, of course, that the PRMI should remain silent on Palestine-Israel until the review reaches comprehensive conclusions. Nof says that we are “rushing” to take public positions on Gaza. However, we do not believe that PRMI failing to write anything about the ceasefire, for instance—the most significant turning point after 15 months of genocide—or on Trump’s shock announcement of a plan for the full ethnic cleansing of the Strip, would have been a sustainable or responsible approach.

9.14. From the outset, it was understood and agreed that while a period focusing on internal discussion and review would be necessary, this could not come at the expense of continuing public-facing activity and the production of public material. Naturally, this creates challenges—like on many other issues, not every article produced will fully satisfy every comrade, as we navigate this transitional period, before arriving at formally agreed political conclusions. However, the claim that some comrades have been intentionally “sidelined” in this process is different in nature, and we do not believe it is based on anything concrete. We want to take this opportunity to reaffirm that we genuinely welcome constructive criticism and input on the material being produced, as critical discussion can only help refine and sharpen our collective approach. Unfortunately, no such feedback has ever been brought to our knowledge.

9.15. We would also wonder whether Nof’s suggestion that the articles recently published reflect some fundamentally “new positions” forced upon comrades is really fair and proportionate. One criticism raised is that the PRMI’s articulation of the right of self-determination is “ambiguous and contradictory”. Below are, for reference, the way this right is formulated in the three articles on Palestine-Israel published on the PRMI blog so far:

9.16. *“Only through a socialist program striving for collective ownership and control, and championing the rights of all national and religious communities to full equality and self-determination, can we lay the foundations for a future where peace, safety, and prosperity are guaranteed for all people.”*

9.17. *“A democratic socialist transformation of this region would mean the creation of a society with justice and equality for all and oppression, exploitation and poverty for none. It would afford both Palestinians and Israeli Jews the right to national self-determination, allow Palestinians the right of return to their historic homeland and for both peoples to live in peace and security.”*

- 9.18. *“Within this [socialist] framework, through democracy and solidarity in the interests of all working-class and oppressed people, Palestinians and Israelis could live in complete equality from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea, including the equal rights of both people to national self-determination.”*
- 9.19. We would welcome further discussion as to why Nof thinks this is ambiguous or contradictory.
- 9.20. Of course, the tension between the need for the PRMI and its entities to continue with their public interventions and the need for internal review discussions is real. This also relates to another point raised by Nof: the fact that some PRMI entities are already undergoing advanced revisions before the international discussions formally begin. However, it is unrealistic to expect all national entities to simply hold on to the positions of an international that is no longer theirs—especially when a majority of members, as in Belgium, believe those positions to be inadequate for intervening in today’s movement.
- 9.21. The urgency to start this international review stems, in large part, from the fact that the entities themselves have demanded it. While we are working to provide an international framework, preventing this process from unfolding organically within the entities themselves, or asking them to ‘freeze’ it until the international review has drawn developed conclusions, would be overly formalistic and top-down—and could even undermine the international review itself.
- 9.22. In fact, we believe it is welcomed and encouraging that members and entities take initiatives to discuss various political issues (as opposed to passively awaiting some “central” plan). This, for us, is a key part of restoring genuine democratic centralism in our organisation, based not on the leadership defining a position and handing it down, but on having the maximum possible involvement of members in decision-making.
- 9.23. Nof suggests that we need a series of structured discussions, including a historical review of our program and its evolution. We completely agree. In fact, several of us in the workgroup explicitly raised these points during our meetings. Yet, in those discussions, it was our impression that Nof was the comrade most insistent on narrowing the focus to our current analysis and perspectives—at one point even expressing surprise at the very idea of conducting a broader review, or having an analysis of the historical development of the Palestine question.
- 9.24. As for the circulation of material in the bulletin, there seems to be a misunderstanding about its purpose. Nof warns that comrades might hear criticisms of our former position without access to the original material to judge for themselves. However, there is a key difference between internal contributions from current PRMI members and articles written by former comrades: all of the latter’s material is readily accessible in the public domain already, and further links to additional material can easily be provided. Moreover, the former comrades’ material

being proposed for inclusion in the bulletin is not a mere “article” but a 6,500-word theoretical document on the national question adopted by their NC in 2016.

- 9.25. Given that we proposed including this resolution in the bulletin, we are somewhat confused by Nof’s claim that in the historical position of the former IP section, “the two socialist states solution” [is] “a formulation that was never used”. While it is true that in the above-mentioned document the explanation is quite nuanced, it nevertheless clearly says that the programme “*will include recognition of an equal right for existence and self-determination, which will be expressed in two socialist states*”. This is not an isolated quote. Peter Taaffe, in his very bad 2014 article, wrote explicitly that “*the CWI has consistently advanced the long term solution of two states - a socialist Palestine and a socialist Israel - with possibly a shared capital.*” In its statement of November 2023, the SSM states quite clearly that Socialist Struggle Movement is fighting “*for the establishment of a democratic, socialist, state of Palestine with full equal rights, alongside a democratic, socialist Israel, with two capitals in Jerusalem and full equality for minorities, as part of a socialist regional confederation.*” The ISA in its MayDay 2024 statement simply called for “*a socialist free Palestine and socialist transformation in Israel.*” The article published by Socialist Alternative in England and Wales in August 2021, presumably with Nof’s involvement, argued that “*the best solution to put forward is two socialist states*”.
- 9.26. It is simply not credible to claim that the formulation was never used; it would be far more constructive to engage with the reasons why comrades in other countries have struggled to engage with Palestinians precisely because it was used.
- 9.27. In conclusion, we want to emphasize that our intention in this discussion is not to sideline anyone but to facilitate the most open review, without pre-determined conclusions or artificial constraints. We deeply regret that Nof has chosen to step back from the workgroup and sincerely hope that she will remain engaged in these debates, as we collectively work toward a stronger and clearer political foundation for our project.